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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE

Saturday July 2, 1977

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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

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State Dept. review completed

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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Saturday, July 2, 1977.

The NID Cable is for the purpose of informing senior US officials.

CONTENTS

25X1

EAST EUROPE: Reaction to Carrillo Attacks

Page 3

25X1

USSR: Dissident Scene

Page 7

NORTH KOREA: Economic Zone

Page 10

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030200010053-7

25X1

Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030200010053-7

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2007/03/09 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030200010053-7

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EAST EUROPE: Reaction to Carrillo Attacks

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[REDACTED] *The East European countries have had mixed reactions to the recent Soviet media assault on Spanish Communist Party leader Santiago Carrillo, whom Moscow has charged with advocating "crude anti-Sovietism."*

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[REDACTED] *The Czechoslovak and Bulgarian media replayed the Soviet *New Times* article attacking Carrillo. The Czechoslovaks added their own critical commentary, accusing the Spanish leader of abetting "the enemy's efforts to divide communist parties."*

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[] Poland and Hungary have adopted a cautious attitude. According to available information, neither has published the text of the Soviet article nor attacked Carrillo directly. Hungary's posture is in line with its belief that open polemics are a hindrance to communist unity, in that each party is free to set its own policies without outside interference. The Hungarians have said that it is "irrational and harmful" to criticize the experience of "socialist" countries--but they have also called "anti-Sovietism" the "most dangerous form of anti-communism."

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[] The Romanians remain out of step with the Soviets despite President Ceausescu's year-long rapprochement with Moscow. Bucharest has not leveled any blast at Carrillo and has even indirectly supported him. The Romanian press reported the Spanish Communist Party's recent decision to adopt what Bucharest called a policy of "cooperation and constructive opposition" toward Prime Minister Suarez. This action underscores Ceausescu's determination to avoid coordinating ideological policies with Moscow, while still trying to improve the overall tone of bilateral relations. The Romanian party apparently intends to maintain its already close relationship with its Spanish counterpart.

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[] Yugoslavia remains the most outspoken in denouncing Moscow's position. On Wednesday, for example, authoritative Radio Zagreb commentator Milika Sundic said that attacks on individual parties violated the spirit of mutual respect and noninterference in internal affairs on which all participants had agreed at the June 1976 conference of European communist parties. Sundic said that those who want to impose their experience on others "have the ambition to rule" them, but he went on to say that a great number of parties are "not willing to sacrifice the interests of their national policy" to Moscow's tutelage. []

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USSR: Dissident Scene

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[redacted] The Soviets' tactic of using various approaches in their handling of prominent arrested dissidents is likely to persist through the fall session of the European security and cooperation review conference in Belgrade. Soviet propaganda continues to develop the theme that dissidents are "renegades" who are being exploited by Western "enemies of detente."

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[] Two members of the Ukrainian chapter of the dissident group set up to monitor Soviet compliance with the Helsinki accords, Mykola Rudenko and Oleksa Tikhy, have been tried on the commonly used and serious charge of anti-Soviet agitation; in Moscow, however, the founder of the charter group, Yury Orlov, has reportedly been charged with the relatively minor offense of anti-Soviet slander. These events contrast sharply with the noisily orchestrated scenario that gives the Soviets the option to try Orlov's colleague Anatoly Shcharansky on charges of treason, implicating US diplomats and newsmen.

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[] The proceedings against the two Ukrainians were the first overtly political trials of any members of the CSCE monitoring group since it became the main target early this year of harsher Soviet antidissident measures. They received the maximum sentences of seven and ten years respectively, followed by a possible five-year term of exile to a remote area of the USSR.

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[] No charges have yet been filed against Aleksandr Ginzburg, the first prominent member of the Moscow CSCE monitoring group to be arrested early this year. Ginzburg was also the administrator at the Moscow end of a fund set up by exiled writer Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn to aid political prisoners and their families. Most sources agree that Ginzburg may thus logically be charged with the nominally nonpolitical crime of foreign currency manipulation or related offenses.

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[] One dissident in Moscow has told the US embassy that Ginzburg, in his attempt to obtain the best possible treatment of the beneficiaries of the so-called Solzhenitsyn fund, did in fact engage in clearly illegal currency speculation. Ginzburg, however, has charged the police with planting foreign currency in his apartment during a search shortly before his arrest. The authorities may be confident that the evidence against Ginzburg, whether fabricated or real, is so obviously nonpolitical that the West would find it difficult to give his case public support on the grounds of human rights violations.

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[] The relatively minor charge against Orlov, which carries a maximum three-year prison term, may be intended to contrast with the other cases, especially that of Shcharansky and

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the serious issue of alleged US espionage activity that it involves. The implied leniency accorded the founder of the monitoring group is probably also a gesture designed to influence the Western position at Belgrade and to balance the case of Shcharansky, whose fate is apparently to be a hostage to developments at the conference.

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[] Some factors that may have influenced the relatively light charges against Orlov are that, unlike Shcharansky and Ginzburg, he is not Jewish, has no previous conviction, and has the status of a corresponding member of the Armenian Academy of Sciences. In addition, the case against him cannot easily be construed as being nonpolitical and would undoubtedly attract much Western attention.

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[] Orlov had previously been invited to the West by several Western academies of science, a factor that could facilitate any Soviet move to exile him whether or not he is tried and serves a sentence. There have in fact been rumors since soon after the arrests of Ginzburg and Orlov that both would ultimately be expelled from the country under one pretext or another.

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[] Real and rumored developments affecting the Shcharansky case have from the beginning been more ominous, and the allegations and propaganda themes developed by Soviet media have progressively widened to include additional targets. The case has evidently been contrived by the Soviets to keep open the option of adversely affecting US-Soviet relations, the course and outcome of the Belgrade conference, Soviet domestic dissidence in general, and Jewish activism in particular.

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[] Most if not all the Soviets questioned during the continuing investigation of the case are Jews; two prominent Jewish activists recently have received permission to emigrate after reportedly being questioned by the KGB and one of them reportedly making a deposition on his relationship with Shcharansky.

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[] By its very nature, the Shcharansky case is designed potentially to serve a wide range of developing domestic and foreign policy interests, and it is therefore unlikely that the Soviets have decided or will soon decide on its disposition.

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It is even possible that Shcharansky may also be ultimately expelled from the country, whether or not he is tried and whether or not Soviet propaganda further exploits the themes developed since his case began.

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[] In Leningrad, meanwhile, two of that city's leading Jewish activists have reportedly received permission to emigrate. Their departure will further weaken the Leningrad dissident Community which has been shrinking for over a year due to emigration and trials of dissidents or relatively minor charges. Despite Leningrad's deserved reputation as a city tough on dissent, the local authorities have so far been content to whittle away at this problem in a relatively low key and lenient manner--probably at least as long as the dissidents there do not attract as much Western publicity and support as have those in Moscow. []

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NORTH KOREA: Economic Zone

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[] North Korea has established a 200-mile economic zone that will go into effect on August 1, according to Pyongyang radio. The North Koreans, with a fairly active distant-water fishing fleet, have opposed the trend toward 200-mile limits in recent years, but they evidently have concluded that the trend will not be reversed and that they should take action now to protect fishing and other resources off their coasts.

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[] Two of North Korea's neighbors, the USSR and Japan, established 200-mile economic zones this year; Tokyo did not extend its claim westward toward the Korean peninsula, but Pyongyang may have anticipated that South Korea would establish such a zone soon.

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[] The North Korean announcement may lead to disputes with South Korea over fishing rights, particularly in the important fishing grounds south of the UN-controlled West Coast islands. The economic zone that North Korea claims will almost certainly extend into part of this fishing area, which has been exploited exclusively by South Korean fishermen and which the South Korean navy regards as a sensitive defense zone guarding the approaches to Inchon harbor. At least in the near term, it appears likely that North Korea will exercise restraint in this area.

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[] The Chinese, who have not declared a 200-mile zone, have sharply criticized South Korea and Japan for moving toward bilateral exploitation of resources on the continental shelf, but China probably believes it can reach an accommodation with North Korea on offshore rights without undue difficulty.

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11
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